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Contracts: Arbitration Clauses in International
Agreements Held Enforceable
In an attempt to expand its overseas operations, respondent
Alberto-Culver Company' purchased from petitioner Scherk
three enterprises operated by him under the laws of Germany
and Liechtenstein. The sale contract 2 provided that one of the
three enterprises was to become a public corporation and that
Alberto-Culver was to acquire 100 percent of its stock.3 All trade-
mark rights of the three enterprises were included in the sale
agreement, and Scherk expressly warranted that the trademarks
were unencumbered. 4 A clause of the agreement provided that
all controversies would be submitted to arbitration in accordance
with the rules of the International Chamber of Commerce in
Paris, France, and that Illinois law would govern the agreement.5
Nearly one year after the closing of the sale, Alberto-Culver al-
legedly discovered that the trademark rights purchased from
Scherk were subject to substantial encumbrances which threat-
ened to give others superior rights to the trademarks. Having
unsuccessfully offered to return the property and rescind the
1. Alberto-Culver Company, a Delaware corporation with its prin-
cipal office in Illinois, manufactures and distributes toiletries and hair
products in national and international markets.
2. The sale contract was negotiated in Germany, England, and the
United States, signed in Austria, and closed in Switzerland. Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 94 S. Ct. 2449, 2450 (1974).
3. Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 613 (7th Cir. 1973).
4. 94 S. Ct. at 2452.
5. The contract provided that:
The parties agree that if any controversy or claim shall
arise out of the agreement or breach thereof and either party
shall request that the matter shall be settled by arbitration,
the matter shall be settled exclusively by arbitration in ac-
cordance with the rules then obtaining of the International
Chamber of Commerce, Paris, France, by a single arbitrator,
if the parties shall agree upon one, or by one arbitrator ap-
pointed by each party and a third arbitrator appointed by the
other arbitrators. In case of any failure of a party to make
an appointment referred to above within four weeks after no-
tice of the controversy, such appointment will be made by said
chamber. All arbitration proceedings shall be held in Paris,
France, and each party agrees to comply in all respects with
any award made in any such proceeding and to the entry of a
judgment in any jurisdiction upon any award rendered in such
proceeding. The laws of the State of Illinois, U.S.A. shall ap-
ply to and govern this agreement, its interpretation and per-
formance.
Id. at 2452 n.1.
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sale, Alberto-Culver commenced an action for damages and other
relief, alleging that it had been defrauded in violation of section
10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19346 and Rule lOb-57
promulgated thereunder. Scherk moved to dismiss or alterna-
tively to stay the action pending arbitration in Paris pursuant
to the terms of the agreement.8 Alberto-Culver in turn sought
to enjoin the prosecution of arbitration proceedings. Relying
heavily upon the 1953 Supreme Court decision in Wilko v. Swan,9
the federal district court denied Scherk's motion and issued a
preliminary injunction restraining him from proceeding with
arbitration.10 The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed on the basis of Wilko.11 The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that an agreement to arbitrate disputes arising out of
such an international commercial transaction is to be respected
and enforced by the federal courts, Scherk v. Alberto-Culver
Co., 94 S. Ct. 2449 (1974).
Arbitration and forum selection clauses have historically
been viewed with disfavor by American courts. Initially, many
courts declined to enforce such clauses on the ground that they
were contrary to public policy or that their effect was to oust
the jurisdiction of the court. 12 This judicial hostility was gradu-
ally overcome by legislation. The New York Arbitration Act of
1920,13 the first of the modern arbitration statutes,14 provided
6. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
7. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974) (employment of manipulative and
deceptive devices).
8. Although Scherk had earlier taken steps to initiate arbitration,
he did not file a formal request with the International Chamber of
Commerce until nearly five months after the commencement of Al-
berto-Culver's action in the federal district court. 94 S. Ct. at 2452 n.2.
9. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
10. See 94 S. Ct. at 2452.
11. Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611 (7th Cir. 1973).
12. E.g., Tetsuuma Kisen K.K. v. Prescott, 4 F.2d 670 (9th Cir.
1925) (clause requiring arbitration as a condition precedent to a court
action held void and unenforceable); United States Asphalt Ref. Co.
v. Trinidad Lake Petroleum Co., 222 F. 1006 (S.D.N.Y. 1915) -(valid ar-
bitration clause under the English Arbitration Act held unenforceable
as an attempt to oust the jurisdiction of the American court). See
Annot., 56 A.L.R.2d 300 (1957); W. STuaGaS, CoMvnvERcMI ARurmATioxs
AND AwARDs § 15, at 45; § 76, at 237-38 (1930); 6 S. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§1919, at 5360 (1938). The courts in the United States adopted this
principle from England. See Vynior's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 597 (D.B.
1609). See also Red Cross Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109
(1924); Haskell v. McClintic-Marshall Co., 289 F. 405 (9th Cir. 1923);
Cotalis v. Nazides, 308 Ill. 152, 139 N.E. 95 (1923); Meacham v. James-
town F. & C.R.R., 211 N.Y. 346, 105 N.E. 653 (1914).
13. N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW §§ 7501-14 (McKinney 1963).
14. See Sonderby, Commercial Arbitration: Enforcement of an
19741
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that agreements to arbitrate future disputes would be irrevocable
and established a procedure for enforcing such agreements. 15
The Federal Arbitration Act of 1925,16 patterned after the New
York Act, made arbitration agreements involving maritime trans-
actions and interstate and foreign commerce valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable. It also provided for a stay of action in federal
courts on issues referable to arbitration under such agreements.17
The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that certain
values are so important that arbitration must not be allowed to
override them. In Wilko v. Swan,'8 the Court enunciated what
has come to be called the public policy exception to the Federal
Arbitration Act.' 9 Wilko involved an action against a securities
brokerage firm to recover damages under the Securities Act of
1933,20 for alleged misrepresentation in the sale of securities.
The defendant brokerage firm moved to stay the trial until arbi-
tration had proceeded in accordance with the terms of an agree-
ment between the parties. The Supreme Court held that the
agreement to arbitrate was unenforceable as applied to future
claims arising under the Securities Act. The Court observed that
such an arbitration agreement would deprive the customer of
the advantageous judicial remedy afforded by the Act, while the
Act itself specifically provided that remedies thereunder may
not be waived by contract.2 ' The Wilko Court recognized that
the policy of the Arbitration Act to secure a prompt and economi-
cal solution to commercial controversies was coming into conflict
with the policy of the Securities Act to protect the rights of in-
vestors. 22 Its decision resolved the conflict in favor of the rights
of investors 23 and announced the general rule that if an agree-
Agreement to Arbitrate Future Disputes, 5 Jon MnsAmAL J. 72
(1971-72).
15. Id. at 75.
16. 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1970). Under the Act, an arbitration agree-
ment "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
Id. § 2.
17. Id. § 3. See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956).
18. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
19. See Sonderby, supra note 14, at 90-92.
20. 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq. (1970).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970).
22. 346 U.S. at 438.
23. It appears that traditional judicial hostility toward arbitra-
tion may also have played an important part in the decision. The Court
pointed out that arbitrators do not need a legal background to be
chosen, arbitration proceedings are not required to have a complete
record, an award may be made without explanation, interpretations of
[Vol. 59:436
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ment for arbitration contravenes a specific provision of another
federal statute, the specific provision will prevail and the arbitra-
tion agreement will not be enforced.24
The Wilko rule has not been applied to every arbitration
agreement involving securities regulation. For example, a dis-
pute between two broker-dealers of an exchange has been
deemed outside the public policy exception on the -ground that
the rules of the exchange, enacted for self-regulation, require
arbitration between the disputing parties. 25 Even a nonmember
broker-dealer has been able to force a member of an exchange
to arbitrate.26 Similarly, Wilko has been interpreted as limited
to agreements to arbitrate future disputes, leaving parties free
to submit controversies to arbitration at the time they arise.27
Finally, courts have refused to apply Wilko when the parties to
the agreement are sophisticated businessmen with relatively
equal bargaining power dealing at "arms-length."28
In 1971, the Supreme Court implied the existence of a new
factor that might be weighed in determining the applicability
of the Wilko rule to arbitration cases. In the context of a forum
selection case, the Court held that the international characteris-
tics of an agreement tipped the balance in favor of upholding
contractual provisions. The Bremen v. Zapata Of-Shore Co. 29
involved a private international towage contract that provided
for resolution of all disputes in the London Court of Justice.
When a dispute arose, the American company ignored the forum
selection clause and brought suit in an American court. The Su-
preme Court held that in the light of present day commercial
realities and expanding international trade, the forum selection
clause should control in the absence of a compelling reason to
set it aside.30 The court of appeals had cited a Supreme Court
the law by arbitrators are not subject to judicial review, and the power
to vacate an award is limited. 346 U.S. at 436-37.
24. For cases applying Wilko to other claims arising under the Se-
curities Act of 1933, see Pawgan v. Silverstein, 265 F. Supp. 898 (S.D.N.Y.
1967); Fuller v. Dilbert, 32 F.R.D. 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
25. Brown v. Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
See also Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1972).
26. Axelrod & Co. v. Hordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838 (2d
Cir. 1971).
27. Reader v. Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(dictum).
28. GCA Corp. v. Coler, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. V 93,339 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
29. 407 U.S. 1 (1971).
30. Id. at 15.
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precedent involving a domestic towing contracts1 and had been
reluctant to concede jurisdiction to the London court for fear
that it would enforce an exculpatory clause in the contract which
would violate American public policy.3 2 In limiting the scope
of its domestic precedent and refusing to invoke public policy
to set aside an international choice of forum agreement, the Su-
preme Court intimated that characteristics associated with an in-
ternational agreement might be sufficient to overcome the Wilko
public policy exception to the enforcement of arbitration as
well.33 In Scherk the court confirmed that intimation.
Wilko had dealt only with the purchase of securities by an
American investor from an American broker-dealer on an Ameri-
can exchange. In contrast, Scherk involved a "truly interna-
tional agreement."3 4 The Scherk Court found that this resulted
in "crucial differences" between the cases.35 Most important was
that the international context of Scherk produced an uncertainty
as to the applicable law that was not present in Wilko. The Court
believed that a "contractual provision specifying in advance the
forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the law to be ap-
plied is ... an almost indispensable precondition to the achieve-
ment of the orderliness and predictability essential to any inter-
national business transaction."36 Without such a provision, the
parties could delay proceedings by seeking an injunction, fol-
lowed by an unlimited number of cross-injunctions issued from
sympathetic forums. The Court was eager to avoid "the dicey
atmosphere of such a legal no-man's land [which] would surely
damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and im-
peril the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into
international commercial agreements.137
The Court reinforced its reasoning by noting the strong con-
gressional endorsement of international arbitration implicit in
the recent acceptance of the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards.3 8
This Convention was appended to the Federal Arbitration Act
31. Bisso v. Inland Waterways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955).
32. Zapata Off-Shore Co. v. M/S Bremen, 428 F.2d 888, 895 (5th
Cir. 1970).
33. 407 U.S. at 12-13.
34. 94 S. Ct. at 2455. See note 2 supra.
35. 94 S. Ct. at 2455.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 2456.
38. Opened for signature June 10, 1958, [19701 3 U.S.T, 2517, T.I,A,S,
No, 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 3.
[Vol. 59:436
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of 192539 to provide that all international arbitration agreements
and awards would be specifically, speedily, and uniformly en-
forced in federal courts. Article 11 (1) of the Convention requires
each contracting state to recognize and enforce written arbitra-
tion agreements for present or future disputes with respect to
a defined legal relationship, whether or not it is contractual, if
the dispute is capable of settlement by arbitration. 40 This lan-
guage is intended to apply to agreements to arbitrate future un-
known disputes as well as existing controversies, and means that
the courts of a country must refrain from deciding a controversy
that is covered by a valid arbitration clause to which the Conven-
tion applies. 41 While the Convention was not strictly applicable
in Scherk,42 it provided a strong indication of congressional
policy.43
In addition to its reliance on the distinctive international im-
plications of the transaction, the Scherk Court observed that the
investor protection policies enunciated in Wilko44 did not compel
extension of the Wilko rule to the facts of Scherk. The securities
legislation was designed to protect the ordinary investor who
deals with a sophisticated broker-dealer under circumstances of
great disparity in either information or bargaining power. Wilko
had involved such circumstances. But quite different considera-
tions emerge in the application of Rule 10b-545 to negotiated
transactions between businessmen.46 Such transactions might
well include an independent audit or other verification of the
39. 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970). See text accompanying notes 16-17
supra.
40. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1970).
41. See Asken, American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age
of Aquarius: United States Implements United Nations Convention on
the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 Sw.
U.L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1971). The restraint is subject to certain specified ex-
ceptions. See, e.g., text accompanying note 51 infra.
42. The implementing legislation had not yet taken effect. See
9 U.S.C. §§ 201-08 (1970).
43. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 94 S. Ct. 2449, 2457 n.15
(1974).
44. See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
45. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1974) (employment of manipulative and
deceptive devices).
46. See GCA Corp. v. Coler, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED.
SEc. L. REP. 1 93,339 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Such considerations might not
have been sufficient to support the result in Scherk, however, were it
not for the international features of the case. Bisso v. Inland Waterways
Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955) (domestic contract between businessmen);
cf. The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1971) (interna-
tional contract between businessmen). See text accompanying notes
28-34 supra.
1974]
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property being purchased or sold, and the sale of securities might
be merely the particular form in which the parties elect to cast
their transaction. In large and complex transactions the parties
might contemplate the possibility of future controversy, and thus
the method of resolving future disputes would itself be a proper
subject of negotiation. In the international arena, the inability
to effectively specify a neutral forum might affect the price of
a sale.4 7 Furthermore, application of the Wilko rule in an inter-
national context would not necessarily even provide the protec-
tion intended by Wiiko, since prompt action by the party seeking
arbitration could still conceivably prevent recourse to the
courts.4 8
Four dissenting justices were dissatisfied with the "'interna-
tional contract' talisman '49 used to distinguish Scherk from
Wilko. They found the Wilko rule and the anti-waiver provision
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to be controlling and
would have upheld the injunction against the arbitration pro-
ceedings because such proceedings would have been offensive to
the public policy of the United States."0 Justice Douglas pointed
out for the minority that the United Nations Convention itself
provides that a court need not enforce an agreement to arbitrate
which is contrary to its public policy. 51 But this view tends to
regard American public policy as embodied only in the Securities
Exchange Act. Wilko had recognized that there were two com-
peting public policies 52 and had simply held in favor of investor
protection. Since that time public policy favoring arbitration
had grown, especially in the international arena, as demonstrated
by the American accession to the United Nations Convention.
This growth in public policy was properly reflected in the Scherk
majority opinion. 53
The precise effect of Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co. remains
to be seen. It may be relegated to the unseemly status of an
exception to the Wilko exception, or it may become established
47. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 13-14;
Alberto-Culver Co. v. Scherk, 484 F.2d 611, 617 (1973) (dissenting opin-
ion).
48. See text accompanying note 37 supra.
49. 94 S. Ct. at 2461 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 2460-61.
51. Id. at 2462. See Convention on the Recognition and Enforce-
ment of Foreign Arbitral Awards, art. V 2(b), opened for signature
June 10, 1958, [1970] 3 U.S.T. 2517, 2520; T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S.
3.
52. 346 U.S. at 438.
53. 94 S. Ct. at 2457 n.15.
[Vol. 59:436
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as a rule in itself. There is strong indication in the majority
opinion that Scherk will become the general rule in interna-
tional agreements, with exceptions made only upon a very clear
showing of the Wilko considerations of disproportionate bargain-
ing power. 4 While Wilko had placed the burden of proof upon
the party trying to enforce arbitration in a securities transac-
tion, Scherk would thus place the burden upon the party at-
tempting to invoke Wilko considerations to enjoin arbitration in
an international transaction. Such a result would be in harmony
with the language of the United Nations Convention cited by
Justice Douglas.r, The Convention declares enforceability of in-
ternational arbitration agreements to be the general rule, with
an exception available when compelled by public policy. The
effectiveness of the Convention would be impaired if the public
policy provision were employed too freely by the contracting
countries.58 Interpreted as recognizing a general rule of enforce-
ability, Scherk will undoubtedly provide desirable stability in
international commercial law by signalling the readiness of the
United States to abide by the United Nations Convention 57 with-
out excessive reliance on the public policy exception. Since it
took the United States twelve years to ratify the Convention,5"
other countries may understandably be wary of the position the
United States will take in its enforcement. Scherk could go a
long way toward dispelling such doubts.
54. Id. at 2456 n.11.
55. See text accompanying note 51 supra.
56. When a state is eager to defeat on public policy grounds an
international arbitration agreement that is sought to be enforced by a
foreign party, its citizens should expect to be subject to the same treat-
ment in foreign courts. Quigley, Convention on Foreign Arbitral
Awards, 58 A.B.A.J. 821, 825 (1972).
57. The Convention has already been invoked to force one Ameri-
can business to abide by the decision of a foreign arbitration panel.
Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 1
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
58. Asken, supra note 41, at 1.
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